



Artificial intelligence as producer and consumer of copyright 
works: evaluating the consequences of algorithmic creativity 
 




Artificial intelligence (AI) has been the subject of a great deal of academic interest in recent times; it has captured the 
attention of copyright lawyers fascinated by the thought of machines creating works of art, music and literature. There is no 
doubt that, as has often happened in the past during previous waves of technological advances, AI platforms—and especially, 
machine learning—have brought with them new opportunities as well as challenges. Machine learning is an AI application 
enabling programs to learn and progress automatically from experience. Its main feature is accessing data and often using it 
for the purpose of creating outputs, including music, literature, movies and art. Amounts of data are observed and analysed 
by the machine, which enables the latter to learn and then make creative decisions leading to final outputs that, as precise 
works of art, are often not foreseeable by the people who developed and started the initial program. Such a process is 
characterised by the absence of substantial human intervention or assistance after the program is operated, and by the use of 
algorithms—namely a sequence of instructions aimed at solving a problem or performing a computation.1 It can be deemed 
“algorithmic creativity”, or the way by which AI/machines create new works. 
  
Consider the example of Jukedeck—a program which employs machine learning to train its system in the rules of music 
theory, and composes music via an algorithm.2 Customers can set parameters, such as music genre (e.g., jazz, blues, rock, 
ambient, chillout, etc.), main instruments, length of the tune, and speed (e.g., up-tempo, low-tempo). The track is then 
composed in around 20 seconds and made available to customers as an MP3 file.3 The Artificial Intelligence Virtual Artist 
(AIVA) is another example of an AI music composer.4 In June 2016 AIVA became the first virtual artist to be recognised by 
an authors’ rights society when it was registered as composer by the French collecting society SACEM.5 The use of programs 
like Jukedeck and AIVA is on the rise, pushing the boundaries of music creation. 
  
In addition to music, AI can produce literature, including poems, novels and news articles.6 Take Brutus, a program that 
writes short stories, which are often intriguing, have a hint of mystery and are written in correct English prose7; or the 
Cybernetic Poet, software which allows a computer to write poetry by adopting the styles and vocabularies of human poets8 
(this technology is also protected by a US patent).9 Technology developed by companies such as Automated Insights10 and 
Narrative Science11 can be used to create automated narratives with no substantial human intervention; the former company 
provides natural language software, transforming data into narratives that can be read and appreciated, while the latter helps 
businesses to do internal and external reporting—e.g. high-volume reporting workflows by using (again) natural language 
generation (an activity which is usually time-consuming when it is undertaken by human beings). 
  
AI is also capable of creating visual art. Examples abound: AARON, for instance, is a computer program produced by 
Professor Harold Cohen that generates artistic images by using real paint (not pixels) on actual canvases (he initially created 
the program in the 1970s and then developed it over time)12; Deep Dream is another popular computer vision program 
(created by Google) that employs a convolutional neural network to find and enhance patterns in images through algorithms, 
and then turns the images fed into the system into dream-like creations.13 Perhaps the best known example is the “Next 
Rembrandt” project—the generation of a new 3D-printed painting produced from data scanned from the famous Dutch 
maestro’s body of artworks.14 The project attracted media interest over the fact that the new portrait in the style of Rembrandt 
was completed using deep learning algorithms and facial recognition techniques. Algorithmically created artworks have 
recently been exhibited as part of a solo exhibition by a robot artist15; such works of art have even been sold at auction for 
significant amounts of money.16 
  
There is no doubt, therefore, that AI technologies are capable of creating tangible and intangible outputs. If such musical, 
literary and artistic expressions were created by humans, no one would object to them being considered as copyright works. 
AI-created works are certainly capable of captivating an audience and stimulating emotions in a similar fashion to works of 
music, literature or art produced by human beings17; some AI-created works have even been accorded an economic value in 
the art market. Yet their *I.P.Q. 114 copyright status is doubtful in several jurisdictions precisely because these outputs are 
generated in large part (and sometimes almost entirely) by machines. The human(s) who triggered the automated process that 
led to the creation of the expression often have no idea how the ultimate work will look or sound. This “unforeseeability” 
seems to break the causal link between the humans who program or use these machines, and the final output produced by the 
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latter.18 In copyright theory, property rights are justified in large part by, e.g., the Lockean argument that the human has 
laboured to create the work; or in Kantian terms, by emphasising that the work arose from the personality of the human 
author.19 Such theories do not fit neatly with a non-human author. 
  
Thus, as machines have learned to mimic human creativity, the copyright world has accordingly entered into AI-driven 
uncharted territory. We aim here to navigate through this territory, providing a road-map of what the legal repercussions of 
AI are, and guidance on what routes the law should take in the future.20 Given the wide-ranging nature of the legal and policy 
issues raised in this article, we take into account the laws of several different jurisdictions, especially the US, the UK and the 
European Union (EU). 
  
Is an AI-created work protected by copyright? Should it be? Who would be viewed as the author? Who should own such a 
work? These questions are the focus of the first part of this article: “AI as producer”. In the second part, “AI as consumer”, 
our analysis shifts to the questions of whether and to what extent the use of data fed into the system, for example to train the 
algorithms, may amount to copyright infringement, or may in certain circumstances be exempted under fair use, fair dealing 
or similar doctrines. In the third part we consider possible legal regimes for dealing with machine produced works including 
alternatives to copyright, such as a public domain scenario and a sui generis system. Finally, we provide our conclusions. 
 
Artificial intelligence as producer 
By any rational measure AI systems can be said to produce works creatively. Moreover, they do so in an accurate, logical and 
independent way, with the final output often consisting of something unpredictable to the humans who programmed the AI 
platform in the first place (as well as the user(s) of the AI).21 As with much content produced by humans, it is often the case 
that a key element of the creative process in AI-enabled works is based on randomness.22 So, is the final output generated by a 
machine protected by copyright—and, if so, who would be seen as its author (and owner)? 
  
This is not a new question 
The issue of whether computational creativity can be protected by copyright is not actually a new one, at least in the US. As 
far back as 1965, the US Register of Copyrights reported concerns to Congress about the rise of computer technology and 
wondered if and where the line between human authorship and computer production should be drawn.23 More than a decade 
later, in 1978, the US National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU Commission) 
reported on the issue and concluded that computers used to produce works were just “inert tools of creation”. The CONTU 
Commission remarked: 
• ”[t]his discussion may have stemmed from a concern that computers either had or were likely to soon achieve 
powers that would enable them independently to create works that, although similar to other copyrightable 
works, would not or should not be copyrightable because they had no human author. The development of this 
capacity for ‘artificial intelligence’ has not yet come to pass, and, indeed, it has been suggested that … such 
development is too speculative to consider at this time.” (emphasis added)24 
 
What the CONTU Commission considered too speculative in late 1970s became commonplace only a few years later. 
Advances in computing technology prompted the US Congress Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) to issue a report in 
1986 arguing that CONTU’s prior approach had been too simplistic and that computer programs were more than mere “inert 
tools of creation”.25 Uncertainty still reigned, however, as in the same report OTA recognised that “we know that these works 
would be copyrightable if they were done by people, but we don’t know what to do with them if they’re done by 
computers”.26 
  
The developments in computational—and more recently artificial intelligence and machine learning—technologies in the 
subsequent decades have made the issues related to copyright in works created by machines more pressing. Academic interest 
in this topic has soared.27 Many of these academic scholars are interested in the question we now turn to: who can be an 
author? 
  
The authorship conundrum 
The question of “who is the author” of the final machine generated output(s) is crucial because under most copyright regimes 
around the world the author of the work is also the first owner of the copyright. Ownership gives the author exclusive rights, 
e.g. to sell, license or otherwise control the work. Traditionally, authors have been human, and copyright’s rationales for 
recognising, rewarding and incentivising creativity through property have human authors in mind. By contrast, AI and 
machine learning technologies enable programmers and/or users (who might otherwise work as authors and artists in their 
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own right) to turn over control to a system that is self-contained enough in key decision-making abilities to operate 
autonomously.28 Therefore, one could argue that automation in this field—in the form of a machine takeover of the creative 
process from humans—is antithetical to the concept of authorship underpinned by copyright. 
  
The requirement for authors/artists to be human is an assumption common in many copyright regimes.29 This principle is 
enshrined in international treaties such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The former states that “everyone” has the right to benefit from the protection of the 
moral and material interests resulting from their works (art.27 UDHR and art.15 ICESCR). The use of “everyone” clearly 
suggests a necessary human element. Furthermore, several national copyright laws limit authorship to natural persons. 
Spanish law, for example, provides that the author is the natural person creating the work30; French law suggests that only a 
natural person can be the author31; and German law provides that copyright protects the author in his or 
herintellectual/personal relationship to the work.32 Likewise, although there is no specific human authorship requirement in 
the US Copyright Act,33 in the Compendium of its practices the US Copyright Office emphasises the importance of the 
human element in the creative process. The US Office only registers an original work of authorship “provided that the work 
was created by a human being”.34 
  
The US Copyright Office has been even clearer when it comes to works generated by new technologies, noting that “the 
Office will not register works produced by a machine or mere mechanical process that operates randomly or automatically 
without any creative input or intervention from a human author”.35 Despite these provisions not having a binding effect,36 they 
nonetheless demonstrate that the US copyright system takes an unfavourable view towards protecting AI- and 
machine-created works via copyright. This attitude has been visible since the early days of computer technological advance. 
  
When in 1956 the US mathematicians Martin Klein and Douglas Bolitho tried to register the computer-generated song “Push 
Button Bertha”, the US Copyright Office refused the registration, adding that no one had ever registered music created by a 
machine37; and in 1964 the same office refused to register a design for a tile floor because it had been produced by a machine 
using random geometric patterns, asserting that the design did not constitute the “writing of an author”.38 A similar outcome 
was reached more recently by the Australian courts. In Acohs Pty Ltd v Ucorp Pty Ltd, the Federal Court of Australia 
considered that the underlying HTML code for information sheets generated by a computer program did not have any author, 
and therefore could not be protected by copyright.39 
  
In the US, the claims of “animal authorship” share some similarities with the claims of AI authorship. In a widely reported 
case—Naruto v Slater 40 —involving copyright in a “monkey selfie” and the enforceability of the alleged copyright to prevent 
the photograph from being exploited, a Californian court rejected the argument brought by the plaintiff, the animal rights’ 
organisation People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), that US copyright law does not prohibit an animal from 
being an author. The court held that, while animals had constitutional standing, they lacked equivalent standing to claim 
copyright infringement of, e.g., a photograph. A similar line of argument was adopted by judges in both the US and UK in a 
string of cases focusing on who the author is in situations where “celestial voices” may have played a role in the creation of 
the work (cases involving so-called psycography, namely automatic writing used for spiritualistic purposes and channelled 
from the spirit world). In these cases, when faced with claims of spiritual authorship, the courts concluded that only humans 
can own the copyright.41 
  
Under European Union law there is no explicit authorship requirement; the concept of authorship in EU copyright law is 
linked to the originality requirement. In Infopaq, the latter has been interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) as requiring the work to be the “author’s own intellectual creation”.42 In Painer, the CJEU clarified that an 
intellectual creation is an author’s own if it reflects her personality.43 This would be the case, the court added, if the author 
were able to express free and creative choices, i.e. a “personal touch”. This suggests that the originality requirement involves 
some degree of human authorship. This point is reinforced by a remark by Advocate General Trstenjak in his Opinion in 
Painer: “only human creations are … protected”.44 This statement does not bode well for the proposition that works created 
by a machine should be considered original and therefore copyright; rather, the view of AG Trstenjak confirms the personal 
and anthropocentric nature of the EU copyright regime—a characteristic embedded within the civil law countries of 
continental Europe that have historically focused on the droit d’auteur approach to authorship as emblematic of human 
creativity and personality. 
  
In the European context what would be required in order to assess AI-produced works as “original” is an objective 
interpretation of the originality requirement (which clearly does not fit into the current EU acquis on this test). Put simply, it 
would require looking at the final output per se—regardless of whether there has been involvement of a human being in its 
generation. In a recent case in Shenzhen, a Chinese court that considered a series of AI-produced news articles to be 
copyright appears to have taken this very approach.45 Thus, the objective interpretation undertaken by a judge, considering the 
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field of art and public to which it is addressed, as well as its closeness to pre-existing works, would be the crucial factors for 
the purpose of determining originality. This would evidently shift the focus from a subjective intention of the human author 
(which Justine Pila has argued in favour of46 and cases such as Lucasfilm align with),47 but which is obviously absent in 
circumstances where robots create independently/autonomously) towards the objective opinion of viewers or listeners of the 
work.48 Nevertheless, as mentioned, the current EU originality requirement actually requires a human touch in the generative 
process, which inevitably makes any objective interpretation of this test difficult if not impossible. 
  
How to face the authorship issue—the “work made for hire” and “adaptation” approaches 
A novel way to deal with the authorship issue may be to consider outputs created by AI as equivalent to works produced by 
employees in the course of their employment (or by independent contractors). In these circumstances (for example, under US 
law) the copyright remains with the employer or the person who has commissioned the creation, who are deemed authors of 
the final output. This is known in US law as the “work made for hire” doctrine,49 namely a legal fiction that implements a 
policy decision to sidestep the real author to attribute copyright to someone else.50 Put differently, this doctrine confirms that 
a person or entity that has not played an active role in the generation of the output is treated as the author of a work actually 
produced by another person (i.e. a human employee or contractor).51 If we extend this doctrine to output produced by AI or 
robots,52 the author of the works would be the person that merely triggered the creative process (without any substantial 
creative role in shaping the final work). 
  
The extension of the “work made for hire” doctrine to algorithmic creations is not unproblematic. A machine cannot be 
compared to an employee, as the former is not given a salary or paid annual leave (and cannot join a trade union).53 Human 
employees have legal rights and duties under agreements entered into with their employers. The machine “employee”, on the 
other hand, cannot be considered as entering into an employment agreement, nor is a computer capable of asserting legal 
rights.54 The fact that programmers or users of a machine “employ” the latter for creative purposes—the argument 
goes—does not make the robot an “employee” capable of triggering the “work for hire” legal fiction. Moreover, applying the 
doctrine in question to AI-produced works would invert the very purpose of the doctrine, which is to consider a work created 
by a human being (e.g. an employee) as authored, via a legal fiction, by another entity which is not human (e.g. the 
employer/company). Conversely, extending this doctrine to the results of computational creativity would end up considering 
a human person (e.g. a programmer or user of AI creative technology) as author of the output generated by the machine (i.e. a 
non-human entity).55 
  
Could an output created by AI be deemed to be a work derived from the computer code which initially created that AI? The 
argument would be that the work in question is based upon a pre-existing work, namely the computer code. Unfortunately, 
this is a weak argument, as the output of an AI generative process often does not have features similar to the ones which 
characterise the underlying code of the AI. Even the US CONTU Commission accepted that computer-generated works are 
“entirely separated” from the underlying program.56 For example, an output generated by AI may frequently not embody 
recognisable blocks of expression taken from the underlying program or from the data the program uses in the creative 
process.57 The resulting AI output is often not based upon, or derived from, the code of the underlying program: in fact, the 
output is produced by the AI itself.58 It cannot, therefore, be a derivative work under US Law (or adaptation under UK law) as 
the latter should include elements extracted from the pre-existing work.59 
  
The UK “pragmatic” approach—considering “the person by whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of the 
work are undertaken” 
A pragmatic approach is visible in the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA) s.9(3), which provides that “[i]n 
the case of a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work which is computer-generated, the author shall be taken to be the 
person by whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of the work are undertaken.”60 
  
The CPDA defines a computer-generated work as one generated by a computer in circumstances where there is no human 
author.61 A few other common law jurisdictions have followed this approach.62 
  
Section 9(3) CDPA essentially introduces a legal fiction. It considers the author a person who has not directly created the 
work, but has merely made the necessary arrangements for such production to take place. In this sense the provision expands 
the notion of author,63 taking into account the objective creation of the output, and then locating the most plausible nearby 
“author” (and owner), which could also be a company.64 This provision could plausibly be extended by courts to cover 
AI-produced output. One criticism of doing so is that it would set the stage for an expansion of corporate ownership of 
copyright works, something evident in the recent decision of the Chinese court in Shenzhen, referenced above.65 
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Provisions such as s.9(3) of the CDPA evidently constitute an exception to the originality requirement as it has been 
historically interpreted by UK courts.66 Traditionally under UK law a work was considered original if it was the result of its 
author’s own “skill, labour and judgement”—though post-Infopaq, the “intellectual creation” test has been used by UK 
courts. In any event, in AI scenarios the works produced (by a machine) do not directly originate from any author employing 
“skill and labour”—or indeed, “intellectual creativity”67 —unless the machine itself is considered an author (a point we reflect 
on later on in this article). 
  
The legal fiction created by s.9(3) CDPA is not an isolated phenomenon in UK copyright law. Section 9(2) CDPA also 
considers as “author” the producer of a sound recording, the producer of a film (together with the principal director), the 
person making the broadcast and the publisher of a typographical arrangement of a published edition.68 Such “authors” (e.g. 
producers) are actually often tied via contract to corporate entities (e.g. record companies).69 
  
The UK provisions on machine-generated works exclude the applicability of moral rights. The author of these works is 
therefore not able to claim the attribution right,70 nor the integrity right.71 It is logical not to award to such “fabricated” authors 
the right to be identified as what, in reality, they are not. This point arose during the debate preceding the adoption of the 
CDPA in 1988; Lord Beaverbrook cast doubts about applying moral rights to computer-generated works, because such rights 
are concerned with “the personal nature of creative effort”,72 whereas the person who undertakes the arrangements necessary 
for the creation of these works “will not himself have made any personal, creative effort”.73 
  
Applying s.9(3) CDPA—considering authorship in the context of programmers and users of AI 
Section 9(3) CDPA may be helpful to identify authorship, and to award ownership, in scenarios where original works are 
produced by computers or robots with no or little human input. In Nova Productions v Mazooma Games,74 the only UK case 
where s.9(3) CDPA has been applied so far, the court had to determine whether copyright had been infringed in the graphics 
and frames generated and displayed on a screen by the users when playing a videogame. It was held that such frames were 
computer-generated works. The programmer was the person who made the arrangements, and therefore the programmer was 
the author and owner of the copyright. As the Court of Appeal put it, 
  
”the player is not … an author of any of the artistic works created in the successive frame images. His input is not artistic in 
nature … and he has contributed no skill or labour of an artistic kind … All he has done is to play the game.”75 
  
Although s.9(3) is certainly useful to courts in making such determinations, its usefulness may decline over time, because 
with each leap forward AI and machine-learning technologies become more and more autonomous and independent of 
humans.76 Complexities also arise when we consider interactive videogames which offer users the chance to create what 
would—in another context—be viewed objectively as original works.77 The game Minecraft is a good example: the aim is to 
pick up and place 3D objects, such as cubes, arranging them, via personal choices, in a 3D grid. In setting up the boundaries 
of the game, the programmer has allowed players a significant amount of freedom in choosing how to play, permitting them, 
e.g., to build entire cities. In these scenarios—as is the case when works are created via AI—it may not be always easy to 
identify who has made the necessary arrangements for the resulting work to be created; in other words, who puts the program 
in the position to create the ultimate work? Is this person the machine’s programmer? Or is it the user? Section 9(3) may not 
provide a clear answer. Determining who that person is should rather entail a careful analysis of the facts, circumstances and 
specific machine application that generated the work. In conjunction with s.9(3) a contextual analysis would therefore be 
necessary78 —an approach that would seem to be in line with the 2019 UK Court of Appeal judgment in Kogan v Martin on 
joint authorship (a doctrine we consider below).79 The investigation is likely to focus on identifying where the creative 
elements in the output of the program originated. Who contributed more to the final product—the programmer or the user? 
What was the quality and nature of the material each of them contributed?80 Should ownership be shared on a proportional 
basis depending on the contributions made e.g. 50/50 or 60/40? 
  
Arguments in favour of the programmer 
That a great deal of intellectual effort is required to write computer code is a strong argument in favour of considering the 
programmers as authors and thus granting them copyright.81 In this view, the work created by the AI/robot represents the 
programmer’s original intellectual conception because that output can be imagined and generated within the boundaries of 
the creative space designed by the programmer; and that happens because the programmer is often able to introduce enough 
constraints and limits on the creative action of both the final user82 and the machine itself.83 In other words, the programmer 
produces the crucial algorithm, and in so doing makes creative choices in selecting the model and preparing the parameter, 
choosing and apportioning data, determining and double-checking additional steps such as observing and adapting the 
algorithm after it has become operative.84 The programmer could thus be considered the author of the final work(s) created by 
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the program(s). For this reason, Annemarie Bridy remarks that in the AI context programmers are the “authors of the 
authors”85 because “people-who-write-programs-that-make-art are authors of the art their programs make”.86 
  
Proponents of this argument also claim that “users” often merely press a button, sometimes unconsciously, and sometimes 
even without knowing they are creating a work.87 The originality requirement is arguably not met where the person who uses 
the machine(s) merely pushes a series of buttons and does not employ any kind of skill or intellectual creativity88; it is instead 
the programmer who carries out the more substantial intellectual activity. Awarding copyright to users of the program in 
scenarios where said users merely press buttons—the argument goes—may encourage people to look for the best programs 
on the market and then take economic advantage of the final work(s), to which they have not actually contributed anything 
significant. Furthermore, as a consequence of not receiving copyright in the final outputs of the program, programmers may 
be discouraged from developing new programs capable of generating music, literature or art. Thus, rewarding the users of the 
program by offering them legal protection may have the adverse effect of creating—downstream—an incentive for “free 
riding” and eventually discouraging—upstream—the creation of new cultural products.89 It may also push programmers and 
owners of programs to restrict the dissemination and use of AI technologies, e.g. via contractual terms, which is arguably an 
unwelcome outcome since it would restrict user freedom.90 
  
Arguments in favour of the user 
Could the user be conceived in positive terms as the person who made the necessary arrangements under s.9(3) for the 
creation of the work? Although the programmer or creator of the machine takes upstream decisions as to the purpose for 
which the program or machine is used, it is the user—one may argue—who eventually triggers the creation of the final 
output. In this view, programmers merely create a “potential for a creation”91 and not its actuality.92 Programs and machines 
are, in this sense, viewed as mere tools engineered to be useful for the creation of works by the final users.93 
  
In fact, at times the user is the person who sets the parameters and provides data for the algorithm in ways that significantly 
influence the final work; and in some circumstances the user may even affect the way the algorithm functions.94 Take for 
example an AI-enabled program capable of producing music, such as Jukedeck, where the user provides relevant inputs that 
affect the song being created, including selecting the instruments, choosing the musical key or tempo, and selecting a musical 
style for the composition. The final musical work could be considered the culmination of creative inputs triggered by that 
user.95 That users in such cases have a closer connection with the generation of the ultimate output is reinforced by the fact 
that the same program, used by different persons, could result in many different sets of outputs, depending on the creative 
choices made by each user, and regardless of the choices previously made by the programmer.96 As the program becomes 
more sophisticated, the works would get more varied because of the program’s associative elements, with the result that 
individual compositions triggered by different users would very rarely, if ever, be identical.97 
  
A positive of viewing users as authors, and accordingly awarding them rights, is that it would encourage them to obtain and 
operate the program in order to create new works,98 which would put them in the optimal position to bring the final outputs to 
the market.99 This could eventually benefit programmers as well, because users would be incentivised to buy the program and 
thus increase its overall value.100 Notably, the market already supplies programmers with the incentive to create the software 
and machines which are used to produce works—the incentive arising from the prospect of maximising profits owing to sales 
and licensing101 as well as from copyright (and sometimes patent) protection of the software itself.102 Awarding copyright to 
programmers for the outputs as well would therefore be to provide over-protection (or what is known colloquially as “two 
bites at the apple”103 and “double dipping”).104 
  
Joint authorship? 
It is logical to argue that the contributions towards the creation of the final output/work) often come from both the 
programmer of the machine (upstream) and the user (downstream).105 To use a metaphor from the natural world, under a joint 
authorship analysis the programmer may be considered as planting the initial “seed” with the user watering it and finally 
harvesting the creative “fruits”.106 In other words, the programmer and the user could be seen as co-operating, with the latter 
adding some creative input and fixing the work under the authority of the former.107 In one sense the copyright requirements 
would apparently be satisfied, with both the programmer and the user contributing sufficient originality towards the final 
work.108 Judges that are called to determine disputes regarding authorship and ownership of AI-generated works might be 
willing to follow this line of argument and find that programmers and users are joint authors. Nonetheless, there is a 
significant problem—it will be difficult to establish a crucial requirement for joint authorship to materialise under UK law 
(and a similar requirement exists under US law), namely a common intent and design between the programmer and a remote 
user, two individuals that typically do not meet and often do not even know each other. Under these circumstances the kind 
of agreement and harmony of interest that is typical of joint authorship scenarios is lacking.109 Even recent liberal and 
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“contextual”approaches to joint authorship—such as the UK Court of Appeal decision in Kogan v Martin —emphasise the 
need for a common design. A final complication is that, even if awarded, joint ownership between two remote persons might 
be difficult to administer in practice, as the copyright would be owned jointly and both authors/owners would need to give 
consent for e.g. licensing.110 
  
Investors as authors? 
Could others be identified as possible candidates for the role of author? What about the (corporate) investor? From an 
economic perspective, one may argue that the entity or even the individual that has invested financial and human resources in 
a technology which is capable of creating music, literature or art would reasonably expect some form of return on the 
investment.111 Although an authorship claim may not be strong because the creative act has not been carried out by the 
investor, an argument could be made about an extension of the “work made for hire doctrine’” so as to cover situations where 
the final work is produced using AI technology promoted by the investor, with the “creative machine” taking the place 
typically occupied by an employee and the former playing the role of the employer.112 This argument is not particularly 
convincing, but it cannot be dismissed out of hand. 
  
Machines as authors? 
Is the computer, machine or robot a potential candidate for authorship? Certainly, the more independent AI systems become, 
the harder it is to identify a human being responsible for the arrangements that lead to the generation of the final output 
higher up the chain. In this view, only the machine can be said to make the key creative choices, understood under the 
originality doctrine as being based on intellectual creation or skill and labour,113 because only the machine is involved directly 
with the production of the work.114 Thus, when the output of a computer contains any “deviations from its input”, the output 
should be considered as “written” by the computer.115 Any instructions and directions from the (human) programmer and user 
would be seen as merely the catalyst for the creation of the final work, the final form of which would be “unforeseeable” 
from the perspective of the human. 
  
As ownership follows authorship, if we consider a machine to be the author of a copyright work, should such a machine also 
be considered as the owner of the relevant economic rights (leaving aside the ownership of moral rights)? If we take this 
argument to its logical conclusion, AI and robots would indeed be awarded legal rights. After all—this argument goes—the 
law recognises that other non-natural “persons”, such as companies, have rights under the law, so it would not be a 
revolutionary step to provide other non-human entities—i.e. AI/machines/robots—with legal rights.116 
  
This may appear, at first sight, to be a fascinating and imaginative scenario—yet, it is unlikely to materialise, especially with 
respect to recognising the legal rights of AI/robots.117 The first strong (and obvious) objection is that machines, computers and 
robots lack legal personhood and therefore are not entitled to claim any legal rights including copyright.118 Giving 
AI/machines/robots legal rights would require, ex ante, answering complex questions about agency, whether machines should 
be considered not as mere products but as employees or agents119; and that would necessitate a further assessment of liability 
issues (in relation to possible violations of rights of others committed by machines). This would be a legal, political and 
philosophical challenge.120 From a practical perspective, it is difficult to imagine a machine being capable of possessing legal 
standing to claim copyright infringement, or negotiating and signing transfers or licences of its rights to others.121 Further to 
this, the analogy with a company’s legal personality is weak, as companies/corporations are vessels for the activities and 
actions of humans—companies only act through their managers, shareholders, or employees—and this direct connection 
cannot be easily compared to the choices made by AI.122 For this reason, the case for AI to be awarded the rights of the 
author/owner cannot be supported. 
  
Having considered the issue of artificial intelligence as creative producer, we next consider how AI consumes and makes use 
of existing copyright works and data in order to learn and create new works. What are the consequences of this for copyright? 
 
Artificial intelligence as consumer 
Creative machines consume. They often devour huge amounts of data as part of learning processes including books, 
photographs, images, articles, social media feeds, videos, and other kinds of content. Data are the building blocks of 
algorithmic creativity.123 
  
Programs that generate music, for example, are fed with huge quantities of source material, from hits at the top of the chart to 
lesser-known pieces, which they assess with a view to finding patterns. Programs process elements such as length, tempo and 
chords, and how musical notes relate to one another, learning from all the input that has been fed into the machine so that 
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they can compose new melodies.124 A similar process occurs in the case of AI-generated figurative art. The Next Rembrandt 
artwork was created after the machine had been fed with high-quality scanned images of 350 paintings by the Dutch maestro; 
meanwhile, over 150 gigabytes of digital graphics were used to give the machine instructions to come up with the textures 
and layers necessary to have the style of a Rembrandt painting.125 The final artwork received mixed reviews from critics, 
dismissed by one as “fan-fiction”—though it is worth noting that even fan-fiction can have an artistic and monetary value.126 
  
What is crucial is that AI systems learn by accessing and analysing pre-existing works and data in order to produce the final 
work. From a copyright perspective this raises an issue: among such pre-existing outputs which are accessed and analysed by 
AI machines there are often works protected by copyright that are owned by third parties. What are the consequences of this 
from a legal perspective? 
  
Copyright infringement risks 
Issues of copyright infringement inevitably arise in this context, as vast numbers of copyright works fall within the net of 
these creative machines; indeed, infringement may occur in relation to both the inputs to and outputs of AI.127 As far as the 
former is concerned, the risk is that a violation of the reproduction right may materialise—machines need to reproduce the 
data they access during the learning process. As to the latter, final outputs may be considered an adaptation of the works that 
are assessed by the machine.128 Since algorithmic creativity has evolved to the point where it can interpret authors’ and artists’ 
styles in digital forms, basing the new works on the existing universe of works previously produced by such authors and 
artists, the infringement analysis here will be dependent on the possibility of recognising in the final product the features of 
the works used in the training process. If the original upstream work has been so changed and transformed that only marginal 
similarities remain in the machine-created output, no infringement would take place. On the other hand, should the final 
product generated by the robot include identifiable and non-secondary elements of an original work, an infringement of the 
adaptation right is likely to materialise.129 
  
Infringement analysis may turn out to be complicated in practice; for example, US law requires the copyright owner to prove 
that the defendant has had access to the copyright work before reproducing and adapting it. In particular, when it comes to AI 
creative machines, malicious and bad faith behaviours may occur to try to “disprove” such access, with, e.g., the programmer 
being tempted to remove a work (a song or a video) from the master list, thereby erasing it from the computer’s memory.130 
  
The fair use debate under US law—distinguishing non-expressive from expressive uses 
As AI and machine learning’s creative abilities are based on the upstream collection and analysis of data, it is important to 
determine when the use of such information by the computer can be considered as fair use under US law. Accurate fair use 
analysis should be based on the distinction between expressive and non-expressive use of copyright material; while the 
former may not be exempted from copyright infringement, the latter is often deemed sufficient to escape liability.131 Existing 
US case law involving technology companies may help to explain this distinction and could be applied mutatis mutandis to 
AI scenarios. Two relevant cases are Kelly v Arriba 132 and Perfect10 v Amazon.133 In both cases the defendants provided 
image search engine services. The plaintiffs (claimants) in Kelly and Perfect10 owned copyright covering certain images that 
had been reproduced in thumbnail form, stored on defendants’ servers, and shown to internet users who used Arriba and 
Amazon services. The courts held that the defendant’s activities were transformative fair uses—and considered the image 
search engines managed by the defendants as simple tools. The courts found that they were not vehicles used to convey 
expression, and the use of the copyright material by Arriba and Amazon was merely instrumental, lacking any artistic or 
aesthetic purpose.134 
  
US courts made similar rulings in two other cases, namely Authors Guild v Google 135 and A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v 
iParadigms.136 The first dispute focused on the Google Books Library Project, which consists of scanning and making 
searchable the book collections of major research libraries. The court found that making copies when the aim is to allow the 
easy search and identification of books that contain a term of interest is transformative and therefore fair. Such a service—the 
court added—does not displace or substitute for books because it is not an instrument that people use to read the books—it 
just facilitates their search. The second case focused on the plagiarism detection service Turnitin (the program consists of 
checking the submitted documents against its database of papers and material). Again, no copyright infringement was found 
by the judge because the use of digital copies of copyright works by the program was considered totally unrelated to 
expressive content, transformative, and therefore incapable of producing a market substitute.137 More precisely, the court held 
that Turnitin does not use the papers for their creative meaning, and even though it stores the whole document, it does not 
publish a full copy of it for other people to access and see it. 
  
This bolsters the argument that certain non-expressive and non-creative uses of copyright works by AI machines would also 
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constitute fair use under US law. Take for example datasets used to train facial recognition AI (such technology is able to 
recognise a person from a digital image). Although training a facial recognition machine often entails copying large 
quantities of copyright-protected pictures, what is being used by the program does not relate to the creative and expressive 
choices made by the photographers—such use focuses instead on matching facts about people’s identity with facts about their 
physical resemblance.138 This is arguably fair use. Similarly, imagine a caretaker robot which accompanies its blind owner to 
a museum, with the robot taking pictures of the walls to read the exhibits and bringing the blind owner to the artworks she 
prefers (or even taking pictures of the sculptures that may represent obstacles in her path).139 Again, here the copyright works 
(paintings and sculptures) are reproduced just for the purposes of pattern recognition, which makes the use non-expressive 
and therefore fair. 
  
A different scenario would occur where copyright works are used to train algorithms for developing new creations. The use 
of the source material could be considered expressive. With The Next Rembrandt artwork the machine was “imbued” with all 
the paintings created by the Dutch artist for training purposes so as to be able to generate a work of art in the style of 
Rembrandt. Another example is the Portrait of Edmond Belamy, an AI-produced artwork sold by auction house Christie’s in 
October 2018 for US$432,500140 —the work was generated after the machine was fed with a dataset of 15,000 portraits 
painted between 1300 and the 20th century. The use of the source material in both cases was not merely mechanical and 
instrumental—it was instead expressive because it aimed at producing a creative output. 
  
One may thus argue that expressive uses of copyright works by AI systems should not be exempt from copyright 
infringement via the fair use defence, especially if the final output is going to be exploited commercially and not, for 
example, used for research purposes.141 These uses are indeed likely to affect the markets where the copyright owner is 
active.142 In particular, authors and artists whose works are analysed and used as source material and in training exercises may 
be deprived of markets they exploit.143 
  
Issues of fairness and balance between rights and obligations should also be taken into account. If programmers, owners or 
users of AI systems want to claim exclusive rights over the final outputs generated by their machines, they should also accept 
responsibility for those works, in relation not only to copyright infringement, but also, for instance, to libel or any other 
source of liability.144 This point makes sense: if you are the one who claims to be an “author/owner” as a result of the 
generative process carried out by the AI system, you should also be liable for when the computer infringes the rights of 
others.145 
  
Giving algorithmic creativity a generous fair use treatment, allowing machines to access and use freely existing copyright 
material for training purposes, may not produce a positive outcome. Why should the programmer, owner or user of AI which 
consumes huge quantities of copyright works for creative purposes be exempt from asking for authorisation for this, while a 
human creator doing the same on a much lower scale cannot take advantage of such exemption?146 What should be avoided is 
a binary copyright regime that discriminates between human creators who access, analyse and use pre-existing copyright 
works, and AI which does the same but at a higher speed and with a much wider reach.147 Terminology may also help explain 
the risk of a double-standard copyright system. When human beings access and use pre-existing source material, we refer to 
“works”. When the same is done by learning machines, the preferred term is the much more apparently neutral “data”.148 
  
There is also a “human displacement” argument. If using copyright source material as input data for AI machines becomes 
rampant and unlimited, some portions of the creative industries market may become totally automated.149 In other words, if 
copyright regimes treat machines more favourably than they treat humans (e.g. by giving them an easier access to the fair use 
harbour) in the long run human beings might be disadvantaged and prevented from competing with AI creators, which could 
reduce human creative efforts. AI could become so adept at creating music, art, movies and literature without the need of 
clearing rights as to eventually become capable of superseding human ingenuity. Would such a scenario be welcomed by 
humans? The answer is certainly “no”.150 
  
A stronger argument could be made in favour of a relaxed fair use regime for AI—aimed at avoiding biases during the 
algorithmic creative processes. How can biases occur? Most 20th-century and early 21st-century works are protected by 
copyright and therefore cannot be reproduced and adapted without permission, a fact which may limit the analysis of data by 
AI technologies. Amanda Levendowski argues that copyright law restricts access to and use of training data to works in the 
public domain, which may contribute to biased AI.151 Most extant public domain material was created at, or before, the 
beginning of the 20th century, when the dominant narrative in the arts and literature was “wealthier, whiter, and more 
Western than it is today”.152 A dataset consisting solely of such public domain source material would inevitably ignore voices 
that had not been made public before the early 20th century, including those of women, people of colour or members of the 
LGBTQI+ communities.153 On the other hand, if under the fair use doctrine AI can access, reproduce and analyse all 
copyright material, the range of pre-existing works that could shape and influence the final (machine-generated) outputs 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3617197
 10 
 
would be more recent, modern, diversity-cognisant, tolerant and thus less biased. Under these circumstances AI systems not 
only would be able to use any kind of work to train their algorithms—they could also make public the kind of material that 
has been fed into the system without being afraid of copyright objections.154 Therefore using copyright works as training data 
is important to minimise the risk of imbuing AI with biases that perpetuate old fashioned attitudes, behaviours and social 
norms. Seen from this perspective, extending fair use to AI systems—especially in relation to expressive uses of copyright 
source material—would promote fairer algorithmic systems that may contribute to mitigating biases and making society more 
tolerant.155 
  
Yet, it remains to be seen how an extension of such doctrine to computational creativity to allow access to huge quantities of 
copyright material can be reconciled with the need to avoid a binary copyright system which treats algorithmic ingenuity 
more favourably than human genius and may eventually constitute a threat to the latter. 
  
Exempting AI uses of copyright material under EU law and UK fair dealing 
What about Europe? Given there is no direct equivalent of US transformative use under UK fair dealing, it is necessary to 
consider the issue through the prism of the narrow exceptions provided under EU law. The key EU copyright rule that could 
exempt certain mechanical and non-expressive uses of copyright works by AI machines—especially, the reproduction of 
input source material fed into the system—is the transient copy exception under the Information Society Directive.156 This 
provision—which remains applicable in the UK, Brexit notwithstanding—exempts temporary acts of reproduction provided 
that they are transient or incidental, an essential part of a technological process, enable the lawful use of a work and have no 
independent significance. It allows the reproduction of a copyright work if the copy is necessary to carry out technological 
and mechanical tasks of no autonomous value—with the classic example being the temporary copy of a webpage stored in 
the browser’s cache. This exception could potentially cover AI scenarios.157 
  
Consider the example of a machine searching for online information on weather forecasts to schedule free days for 
customers, with extracts of such information being stored in the machine as transient or incidental copies just for the purpose 
of transmitting a work across a network between third parties.158 Reproducing the works seems here essential to the training 
process—and the copies need not be kept in the system after running through the neural network. This use of copyright 
material is non-expressive and will likely be considered legal under EU copyright law (as well as in UK law and in the laws 
of most EU Member States).159 As copyright owners in such circumstances do not suffer economic harm, the use of the 
protected works is likely to pass the “three-step test” under the Information Society Directive, which states that any exception 
under this piece of legislation, including the transient copy exception, “shall only be applied in certain special cases which do 
not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work or other subject-matter and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the rightholder”.160 Furthermore, in the case of Football Association Premier League v QC,161 the CJEU 
highlighted the need to strike a fair balance between the interests of copyright owners and the users of protected works who 
would benefit from copy-reliant technologies. 
  
There is another exception in EU copyright law that may be relevant in these scenarios. It is the text and data mining 
exception to the reproduction right introduced by the 2019 EU Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market (at time of 
writing the UK Government has indicated it will not bring this into UK law).162 Could uses of copyright material fed into the 
AI platform be excluded under this provision? Text- and data-mining activity allows the extraction and use of significant 
amounts of digitally available information,163 e.g. to discover scientific research opportunities in corporate documents, social 
media feeds, medical records, academic articles and other sources of text-based data. 
  
This is potentially useful to AI creative platforms that are fed with vast quantities of data. Yet, the exception under the EU 
Directive is limited. First, the text- and data-mining activity can be carried out freely only by research organisations and 
cultural heritage institutions for the purposes of scientific research.164 This provision may push AI companies that engage in 
text and data mining to opt for public-private partnerships with public research centres165; but any commercial exploitation of 
the final work created by the machine after being fed with the copyright material is likely to be limited, if not excluded 
entirely.166 Another provision of the Directive appears in principle to allow text- and data-mining activities by business and 
for-profit entities, and for any purpose (for example for the reproduction of copyright material).167 Yet, such an exception 
does not apply if copyright owners have reserved the right to mine—which means that the exception can be easily overridden 
by the copyright owners’ indication that they do not want to allow such activity.168 
  
The limitations to the text and data mining exception under EU law significantly restrict the opportunities for AI 
business-oriented organisations to carry out such activities in the context of machine learning platforms—and this is true in 
relation to both expressive uses of prior copyright works for creative purposes (which can be hailed as a positive outcome in 
light of the arguments developed earlier in this part) and non-expressive and merely mechanical uses of such material (which 
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can be considered instead a negative outcome taking into account that such uses have less chance of prejudicing the interests 
of copyright owners). On the other hand, research centres, heritage institutions and other similar entities that use AI for 
non-profit purposes will be free to engage in text and data mining activity. It remains to be seen if (in addition to merely 
mechanical uses of pre-existing copyright works) non-profit organisations can also engage under this exception with respect 
to expressive and creative AI uses of the mined data; a clarification by some EU Member States’ national courts or even the 
CJEU on this issue may be required. Having considered the issue of AI as consumer, we now return to the question of how to 
deal with the production of new works by AI. 
 
Evaluating the public domain and sui generis right as solutions 
Having outlined the various problems with awarding ownership to the programmer or user (separately or jointly) or to the 
AI/machine itself, we turn now to alternative proposals that may provide a solution to the question of whether and how the 
results of algorithmic creativity should be legally protected. 
  
The public domain solution 
A tempting option could be to deem the works created by machines as automatically entering the public domain. As there is 
no human author directly involved in the creative production of the output, we could argue that no one should be able to 
claim exclusive rights over it.169 Works produced by robots would thus be comparable to things found in nature, such as 
music that the wind generates when it moves through wind chimes, or the sounds of a waterfall, or birds singing at dawn170 
—outputs which cannot be monopolised by anyone.171 There is also an (obvious) incentive-related argument that supports this 
position. Machines are not able to respond to the incentives/rewards offered by copyright—and therefore their works should 
remain in the public domain (at least until technology evolves deeply so as to give machines some sort of human-like 
consciousness, but for now we can eliminate this possibility).172 
  
This solution would also neutralise the anti-competitive risks that an over-proliferation of strong and long-lasting exclusive 
rights protecting AI produced output, owned by corporate entities, may bring. Seven commercial companies working with AI 
technologies—Apple, Google, Microsoft, IBM, DeepMind, Facebook and Baidu—already dominate this lucrative market.173 
The scenario would turn even more anti-competitive if a US-style work-made-for-hire approach were used in relation to these 
works, with the programmer/employer considered the author and thus copyright owner; the same would be likely to result if 
the UK s.9(3) approach were used. There is little doubt that AI companies would be attracted by the idea of securing 
ownership of exclusive rights in such works—it might even encourage them to hoard their AI technologies, so as to always 
remain the “employers” and therefore the right holders. This would consolidate the dominant position of a few tech 
companies.174 
  
The public domain option is not just a theoretical proposal—it is already operative in jurisdictions such as the US, which (as 
we have discussed earlier) do not explicitly protect, via copyright, works generated by machines.175 Australian copyright law 
does not consider such works protectable either.176 In these jurisdictions public domain seems the default position. Several 
scholars support this approach.177 
  
Is this solution desirable? Would the refusal to offer works generated via algorithmic creativity legal protection discourage 
investments in, and dissemination of, the underlying AI technologies? Given that the law of copyright (and in some cases, 
patents) is already available for protecting the underlying programs themselves, even if not the outputs, it is plausible that a 
sufficient incentive already exists. On the other hand, without the lure of the exclusive rights offered by copyright, we cannot 
rule out that the incentives to develop and make available AI machines capable of creating musical, literary or artistic outputs 
could be lessened.178 As this argument goes, denying legal protection of machine-generated outputs may not have the effect of 
increasing the public domain in the long term; it could instead reduce the incentives to create new AI works, and may 
ultimately lead to a lower number of these outputs being produced, and accordingly, a decrease in works that would 
eventually enter the public domain. In this view, the arts, education and technology sectors may not see sufficient 
investments into research on AI applications.179 
  
There is a good reason to be sceptical of such arguments—after all, property rights are not the only incentives to create. 
Investment in AI platforms can be encouraged by factors other than the availability of copyright. Academic and industry 
respect and recognition, commercial gains through sales of AI programs to other users, and, of course, the human desire and 
passion to create would still be present—providing AI developers and organisations with incentives to come up with AI 
technologies.180 Moreover, in the digital market, high demand for instantly consumable media produces a significant 
first-to-market motivation that materialises independently of copyright being available.181 Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, 
the software code which is incorporated in the machine may itself be protected by copyright law (or patent law in some 
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cases),182 with trade secrets and copyright protection of databases consulted by the program also being potentially useful.183 
  
Nonetheless, there is a genuine concern that if copyright jurists decide that AI works should not be protected, and should 
instead reside in the public domain—this could encourage (human) dishonesty. Human authors who have used AI 
technologies to create works may be wary of revealing this for fear that to do so would make the resulting works 
unprotectable. Surely, the law should not encourage dishonesty? 
  
This not a hypothetical problem. Robert Plotkin narrates how a team of computer scientists and musicians from University 
College London developed a music composition machine that composed music based on an automated assessment of Top 10 
tracks; yet, the role of the machine was kept confidential as the music label that invested in the project did not want to 
disclose that its songs had in fact been written by a machine and not by human musicians. The label was so keen in keeping 
the involvement of the machine confidential that it even staged meetings with human composers, allowing them to act as 
copyright holders, receiving royalties.184 An increase in dishonest practices seems inevitable if AI works remain 
unprotectable. Further to this, there is no doubt that corporate entities will argue in favour of (at the judicial level) and lobby 
for (at the legislative level) some form of exclusive rights over AI-produced outputs. For this reason, it is worth evaluating 
whether rather than giving full protection to such works, there may be a justification for awarding a more limited type of 
protection. 
  
A sui generis right for works created via algorithmic creativity? 
We have seen that at present copyright regimes may not be fit to accommodate what is produced by algorithmic creativity; 
indeed, copyright laws in several jurisdictions do not explicitly protect machine created works. The lack of human 
authorship/originality is a key factor in this regard. Yet, whether we agree or not, it is inevitable that corporate entities will 
lobby for a form of exclusive rights to protect the final outputs of machine-driven processes. Could an acceptable 
compromise be offered by a sui generis system—a kind of protection that could incentivise the development of and use of AI 
creative platforms while at the same time safeguarding human ingenuity?185 The benefit of a sui generis regime (as opposed to 
using the full scope of copyright to protect such works) would be that right holders could be given only a thin scope of 
protection, allowing them to prevent others from exploiting exact copies of the machine-generated work. In this view, it 
would essentially be protection against literal copying only.186 As to the length of protection, unlike the typical copyright 
duration, a very short duration could be applied in the AI context e.g. three years from the date of publication of the work (the 
length of term suggested in a recent AIPPI “Study Question” by Dutch delegates).187 
  
Why should a thinner and shorter right be preferred?188 The usual justifications for the long duration in the context of human 
authors would not apply. In fact, providing AI developers and companies incentives for AI-created works by offering the 
strong traditional copyright protection/duration may even lead to fewer human-generated works being created in the long 
run.189 AI creative capacity is potentially both more vast and speedier than human capacity.190 The risk is a devaluation of 
human intellectual ingenuity and a marginalisation of the human creative potential.191 Just as automation threatens (and, over 
time, eliminates) existing jobs in manufacturing, AI creativity could threaten the value of human authorship. 
  
The provision of a limited sui generis right might neutralise this risk by providing an incentive to recognise the creativity of 
AI works without giving machines an equal level of protection to humans.192 The fact that only literal copying would be 
prohibited would leave human creators free to adapt, transform and reinterpret AI-generated works and thus to use them for 
creative purposes. In fact, such a feature of the proposed sui generis right may fit with the characteristics of many AI 
machines such as Amper, an AI music composition system.193 
  
With regard to AI consumption, the thin sui generis right may be coupled with interpreting the relevant fair use (US) or fair 
dealing (UK) rules governing the internal processes of algorithmic creation in line with what we discussed earlier in this 
article.194 Overall it is arguable that the introduction of a thin and time-limited right could achieve an appropriate balance: 
while some incentives would still be given to the developers of AI creative technologies via the offer of exclusive rights 
aimed at preventing the exploitation of the final output by third parties, the reduced scope and duration of the protection will 
leave human creators with enough freedom and motivation to create. Such a balance would preserve value in human 
ingenuity (fully protectable by copyright) and at the same time sufficiently protect machine produced outputs (and thus 
encourage investments in and use of AI technologies).195 
  
What would the requirement for attracting the sui generis protection be? An originality test as assessed and interpreted 
objectively and contextually would be appropriate.196 As discussed earlier, judges could consider the work’s aesthetic, literary 
or artistic similarity to existing works when considering originality, in the sense of being sufficiently distinguishable from 
prior works. While this would necessarily differentiate the originality standards between human created works and AI works, 
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it is worth noting that the requirements for attracting protection can vary even under existing laws. Under UK law, for 
example, while graphic works, photographs, sculptures and collages attract copyright based on originality “irrespective of 
artistic quality”, other fruits of human creativity like works of artistic craftsmanship are protected only if they reach a certain 
threshold.197 
  
Who would the owner of such a sui generis right be? The UK AIPPI Group identifies two possible approaches, i.e. the 
proximity and the investment approaches.198 By using the proximity criterion, the owner could be: (i) the natural or legal 
person that is most closely associated with the creative output—for example the person who comes up with the code (coder); 
or (ii) the person who identifies the objective to be reached (goal selector); or (iii) the person who chooses the input data 
(data selector); or (iv) the person who trains the AI (trainer); or (v) the person who carries out a qualitative or aesthetic 
selection of a work from a number of new artificially generated works (output selector).199 Unsurprisingly, the UK Group of 
AIPPI favours the investment approach on the basis of legal certainty, thus clearly arguing for corporate ownership, i.e. that 
the natural or legal person who invests in the project should be considered the owner of the sui generis right.200 
  
EU law supports this. The EU Info-Society Directive in Recital 5 recognises that 
  
”[t]echnological development has multiplied and diversified the vectors for creation, production and exploitation. While no 
new concepts for the protection of intellectual property are needed, the current law on copyright and related rights should be 
adapted and supplemented to respond adequately to economic realities.” (emphasis added) 
  
Recital 5 mentions “related rights” as referring to rights protecting outputs such as cinematographic works, sound recordings 
and broadcasts. A sui generis right protecting AI-created works might fit well into the “related right” category of rights that 
aims at incentivising investments in crucially relevant technological fields.201 
  
There are of course arguments that caution against the introduction of a sui generis system. Creating sui generis laws to 
accommodate the needs of a certain sector or industry fails to keep copyright regimes technology-neutral.202 Yet, it could be 
counter-argued that copyright laws bring with them the seed of “differentiation”. These laws have produced across the 
decades different rules in relation to different works. For example, the range of copyright works are quite distinct from each 
other, from literary, artistic and musical works to more entrepreneurial (and investment-driven) kinds of subject matter 
including typographical arrangements of published editions, original compilations of data, sound recordings and broadcasts. 
  
Perhaps the greatest concern with the enactment of a new right would be the danger of increased corporate ownership. This is 
undoubtedly a worry. However, the recent Shenzhen case demonstrates that in the absence of a thin sui generis right, 
corporate entities will attempt to claim the full rights of copyright over AI created works. Thus, even if there are risks 
attached to a sui generis system, if it is enacted in a balanced way the risk of consolidating monopolistic rent-seeking power 
may be significantly reduced, if not completely ruled out. 
 
Conclusion 
It is true that there is a person “behind every robot”203 because machines are created, programmed and directed by human 
beings. Yet, there is also little doubt that nowadays art, music, literature and movies, among other outputs, are being 
generated semi-autonomously by machines without relevant human choices being made over the final works. As the 
technology progresses further, the direct role of human beings in algorithmic creativity is likely to become more and more 
distant. Awarding copyright ownership to such humans seems less justifiable the more remote the human intervention 
becomes. 
  
At the same time, we acknowledge that machines should not be considered authors/owners in their own right; aside from the 
complexities of agency that arise if authorial rights are given to non-humans, the simple fact is that machines need no 
incentives/rewards to create.204 Computers produce works for one reason—they are devised and programmed to execute 
certain functions and trained to do so accurately.205 Machines do not get tired, do not crave maximum hour or minimum wage 
protection, and can concentrate incessantly on their tasks, no matter how complicated or tedious.206 What it takes to make 
these machines work is just electricity,207 wires, various electronic devices and an internet connection.208 
  
Nonetheless, as the kinds of works produced by AI increasingly resemble works traditionally made by humans, there will 
inevitably be claims by corporate actors that the machine-generated outputs should be considered protected by copyright (and 
owned by corporate actors). We caution against this development, while also acknowledging it may be inevitable that some 
form of protection is required. Even scholars that are sceptical about extending copyright to AI produced outputs believe that 
if a machine is capable—for example—of writing fiction that is interesting enough to capture audiences willing to pay, it 
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would be logical for the programmer, owner or user of such a machine to attempt to protect such value, not only via 
technological measures or contractual provisions, but also through copyright law.209 Indeed, it would be odd if these works 
were left unprotected (and in the public domain), as this would bring about an absurd result: a very simple and banal stick 
man sketched by a human hand in just a few seconds would be more worthy of protection than a sophisticated 
machine-created painting such as the Next Rembrandt or the Portrait of Edmond Belamy.210 
  
So, what kind of protection should be offered to the fruits of algorithmic creativity? We have demonstrated that copyright 
regimes—for example in the UK, US, Australia and under EU law—might not be the best fit. Indeed, considering 
AI-generated output as copyright may require overstretching and rethinking important rules and principles, such as the 
authorship and originality requirement, which are at the core of copyright systems and are still anchored to romantic views 
focused on the centrality of the human author. The traditional copyright system may not be adequate for another reason: the 
long duration awarded to works of human authorship. 
  
A sui generis right might therefore be an acceptable solution, i.e. a system that could strike a fair balance between the need to 
encourage the creation of these technologies (through the offer of exclusive rights) and the need to guarantee that 
human-made creativity continues to thrive despite machines’ competition. The scope of protection given by the sui generis 
right should be thin, and backed up by a strict fair use/fair dealing doctrine, and its duration would be very short (e.g. three 
years). 
  
Lastly, there is no doubt that protecting AI-generated works will shift the focus from the subjective element of traditional 
creative processes (the centrality of the human author) to the objective outputs produced by machines, thus changing the 








Hereinafter in the context of this article we will use interchangeably the terms “AI”, “machine”, “robot”, 
“computer”, “program” and “algorithm” when referring to technologies capable of producing outputs 




Emma Featherstone, “Introducing the next generation of music makers” (29 August 2017), The Guardian, 
https://www.theguardian.com/small-business-network/2017/aug/29/computer-write-music-jukedeck-artifici




Featherstone, “Introducing the next generation of music makers” (29 August 2017), The Guardian, 
https://www.theguardian.com/small-business-network/2017/aug/29/computer-write-music-jukedeck-artifici








Bartu Kaleagasi, “A New AI Can Write Music as Well as a Human Composer – The future of art hangs in 
the balance” (9 March 2017), 





Technologies that are capable of composing music can also be patented inventions. One such example is 
international patent WO/2008/077128, owned by David Cope, protecting an invention entitled 
“Recombinant music composition algorithm and method of using the same”. The abstract of the invention 
tells us that: “The present invention provides a retrograde recombinant composition algorithm that creates 
new musical compositions based on existing musical compositions that are preferably written in software 
and is suitable for implementation in electro-mechanical and electronic devices that generate musical works 
based on existing bodies of music. The retrograde approach to recomposition according to the present 
invention provides a highly simplified code that executes at a high speed, and accordingly a reduced need 
for computational resources.” See the WIPO webpage at 
https://patentscope.wipo.int/search/en/detail.jsf?docId=WO2008077128 [Accessed 18 March 2020]. 
 





Selmer Bringsjord and David Ferrucci, Artificial Intelligence and Literary Creativity: Inside the Mind of 









See US patent No.6,647,395: “A method of generating a poet personality including reading poems, each of 
the poems containing text, generating analysis models, each of the analysis models representing one of 
poems and storing the analysis models in a personality data structure. The personality data structure further 













Harold Cohen, “The further exploits of AARON, Painter” (22 July 1995), 




Alex Rayner, “Can Google’s Deep Dream become an art machine?” (28 March 2016), The Guardian, 





Chris Baraniuk, “Computer Paints ‘New Rembrandt’ after Old Works Analysis” (6 April 2016), available 




This is the case of Ai-Da, “the world’s first ultra-realistic AI humanoid robot artist”, who had her first solo 
exhibition of eight drawings, 20 paintings, four sculptures and two video works in Oxford in June 2019: see 
Matthew Stock, “Ai-Da, The Humanoid Robot Artist Gears up for First Solo Exhibition” (5 June 2019), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tech-robot-artist/ai-da-the-humanoid-robot-artist-gears-up-for-first-solo-




See the $432,500 sale by the auction house Christie’s in October 2018 of the AI-created portrait in a gilt 
frame Portrait of Edmond Belamy (see Christie’s webpage at 
https://www.christies.com/features/A-collaboration-between-two-artists-one-human-one-a-machine-9332-1




Jared Vasconcellos Grubow, “O.K. Computer: The Devolution of Human Creativity and Granting Musical 
Copyrights to Artificially Intelligent Joint Authors” (2018) 40 Cardozo Law Review 409 (noting, with 
specific reference to music, that “Al learns the notes, rhythms, and other musical elements of each work, it 
assigns weights to them until it can accurately predict subsequent notes and rhythms within a genre. Each 
note output is a subsequent input for generating a musical phrase. The weights, linked to specific neurons 
and layers of the neural network, resemble human emotions when we hear music we like – chemical 





Pamela Samuelson, “Allocating Ownership Rights in Computer-Generated Works” (1985–86) 47 U. Pitt. 




Martin Kretschmer and Friedemann Kawohl, “The History and Philosophy of Copyright” in Simon Frith 
and Lee Marshall (eds), Music and Copyright (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 2004), pp.21–53. 




Annemarie Bridy, “Coding Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially Intelligent Author” (2012) Stanford 




Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, “Generating Rembrandt: Artificial Intelligence, Copyright, and Accountability in 
the 3A Era – The Human-Like Authors are Already Here – A New Model” (2017) Mich. St. Law Review 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3617197
 16 
 




It has been argued that the fact that AI creative processes are based on randomness and unpredictability 
should not be considered as a bar to copyright. Indeed, such features are also shared by creative processes 
unleashed by human beings: see Samantha Fink Hedrick, “I Think, Therefore I Create: Claiming Copyright 
in the Outputs of Algorithms” (2019) 8 NYU J. Intell. Prop. & Ent. L. 324, 365 (also noting that “had 
randomness or unpredictability been a bar to creativity, Jackson Pollock would have been unable to claim 
copyright in any of his works, as he could not have known precisely where each drop of paint would fall on 
the canvas, or the shape that every splatter would take upon contact. To claim copyright, control over a 
work must be sufficient, but not complete”). In the same article (p.343) Hedrick also argued that knowledge 
of the intricacies of deep learning is not conclusive, as a programmer can still maintain control even 
without a complete understanding of its operations, in the very same way a young and unexperienced 
photographer who chooses a setting on her camera, without understanding what it does or how it works, 
will still be able to use those settings to manipulate the output; see also Grubow, “O.K. Computer” (2018) 
40 Cardozo Law Review 409 (noting, with specific reference to music, that the unpredictability of the final 








National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU Commission) – Final 
Report (1978), p.44; see also Ithiel De Sola Pool, “The Culture of Electronic Print” (1982) 111 Daedalus 29 





US Office of Technology Assessment, “Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Electronics and 




US Office of Technology Assessment, “Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Electronics and 
Information” (1986), p.69. See also Yanisky-Ravid, “Generating Rembrandt” [2017] Mich. St. Law 




Darin Glasser, “Copyrights in Computer-Generated Works: Whom, If Anyone, Do We Reward?” (2001) 1 
Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 24; Charles Cronin, “Virtual Music Scores, Copyright and the Promotion of a 
Marginalized Technology” (2004) 28 Colum. J.L. & Arts 1; William Ralston, “Copyright in 
Computer-Composed Music: HAL Meets Handel” (2005) 52 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 281; Mark Perry 
and Thomas Margoni, “From Music Tracks to Google Maps: Who Owns Computer-Generated Works?” 
(2010) 26 C.L.S.R. 621; Jani McCutcheon, “The Vanishing Author in Computer-Generated Works: A 
Critical Analysis of Recent Australian Case Law” (2013) 36 Melbourne University Law Review 915; 
Emily Dorotheou, “Reap the Benefits and Avoid the Legal Uncertainty: Who Owns the Creations of 
Artificial Intelligence?” (2015) 21 C.T.L.R. 85; Burkhard Schafer, Davis Komuves, Jesus Niebla Zatarain 
and Laurence Diver, “A Fourth Law of Robotics? Copyright and the Law and Ethics of Machine 
Co-Production” (2015) 23 Artificial Intelligence and Law 217; Robert C. Denicola, “Ex Machina: 
Copyright Protection for Computer-Generated Works” (2016) 69 Rutgers L. Rev. 251; Madeleine de Cock 
Buning, “Autonomous Intelligent Systems as Creative Agents under the EU framework for Intellectual 
Property” (2016) 7 European Journal of Risk Regulation 310; James Grimmelmann, “There’s No Such 
Thing as a Computer-Authored Work” (2016) 39 Colum. J. L. & Arts 377; Annemarie Bridy, “The 
Evolution of Authorship: Work Made by Code” (2016) 39 Colum. J.L. & Arts 395; Bruce Boyden, 
“Emergent Works” (2016) 39 Colum. J.L. & Arts 377; Ryan Abbott, “Artificial intelligence, Big Data and 
Intellectual Property: Protecting Computer-Generated Works in the United Kingdom” in Tanya Aplin 
(ed.), Research Handbook on Intellectual Property and Digital Technologies (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
2017); Ana Ramalho, “Will Robots Rule the (Artistic) World? A Proposed Model for the Legal Status of 
Creations by Artificial Intelligence Systems” (2017) 21 Journal of Internet Law 12; Benjamin Sobel, 
“Artificial Intelligence’s Fair Use Crisis” (2017) 41 Colum. J.L. & Arts 45; Kalin Hristov, “Artificial 
Intelligence and the Copyright Dilemma” (2016) 57 IDEA: The IP Law Review 431; Robert Yu, “The 
Machine Author: What Level of Copyright Protection Is Appropriate for Fully Independent 
Computer-Generated Works?” (2017) 165 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1245; Andres Guadamuz, “Do Androids Dream 
of Electric Copyright? Comparative Analysis of Originality in Artificial Intelligence Generated Works” 
[2017] I.P.Q. 169; Amir Khoury, “Intellectual Property Rights for Hubots: On the Legal Implications of 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3617197
 17 
 
Human-like Robots as Innovators and Creators” (2016–17) 35 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 635; Enrico 
Bonadio, Luke McDonagh and Christopher Arvidsson, “Intellectual Property Aspects of Robotics” (2018) 
9 European Journal of Risk Regulation 655; Jane Ginsburg and Luke Budiardjo, “Authors and Machines” 
(2018) 34 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 343; Nina Brown, “Artificial Authors: A Case for Copyright 
in Computer-Generated Works” (2018) 20 Columbia Science & Technology Law Review 1; Daniel 
Schönberger, “Deep Copyright: UP- and Downstream Questions Related to Artificial Intelligence (AI)” in 
Jacques De Werra (ed.), Droit d’auteur 4.0 / Copyright 4.0 (Geneva/Zurich: Schulthess Editions 
Romandes, 2018); Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid and Luis Velez-Hernandez, “Copyrightability of Artworks 
Produced by Creative Robots and Originality: The Formality-Objective Model” (2018) 19 Minn. J.L. Sci. 
& Tech. 1; Garrett Huson, “I, Copyright” (2018) 35 Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal 54; Daryl 
Lim, “AI & IP: Innovation & Creativity in an Age of Accelerated Change” (2018) 52 Akron Law Review 
813; Victor M. Palace, “What If Artificial Intelligence Wrote This: Artificial Intelligence and Copyright 
Law” (2019) 71 Fla L. Rev. 217; Tanya Aplin and Giulia Pasqualetto, “Artificial Intelligence and 
Copyright Protection” in Rosa Maria Ballardini, Petri Kuoppamäki and Olli Pitkänen (eds), Regulating 
Industrial Internet Through IPR, Data Protection and Competition Law (The Hague: Kluwer International, 
2019); Tim Dornis, “Artificial Creativity: Emergent Works and the Void in Current IP Doctrine” (2020) 22 
Yale Journal of Law & Technology 1. For a recent literature review on the subject, see Technical Report by 
the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the European Commission, authored by Maria Iglesias, Sharon 
Shamuilia and Amanda Anderberg, Intellectual Property and Artificial Intelligence (2020). For key papers 
from the 1960s–1990s: see Karl F. Milde Jr, “Can a Computer Be an ‘Author’ or an ‘Inventor’?” (1969) 51 
J. Pat. 378; Timothy L. Butler, “Can a Computer be an Author – Copyright Aspects of Artificial 
Intelligence” (1982) 4 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 707; Stephen Hewitt, “Protection of Works Created by 
the Use of Computers” (1983) 133 New L.J. 235; Dan Rosen, “A Common Law for the Ages of Intellectual 
Property” (1984) 38 U. Miami L. Rev. 769; Evan H. Farr, “Copyrightability of Computer—created works” 
(1989) 15 R.U.C.T.L.J. 63; Robert J. Hart, “Author’s Own Intellectual Creation – Computer Generated 
Works” (1993) 9 Computer Law and Security Review 164; Arthur R. Miller, “Copyright Protection for 
Computer Programs, Databases, and Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?” 
(1993) 5 Harvard Law Review 977; Tal Vigderson, “Hamlet II: The Sequel: The Rights of Authors vs. 
Computer-Generated Read-Alike Works” (1994) 28 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 401; Ralph Clifford, “Intellectual 
Property in the Era of the Creative Computer Program” (1997) 71 Tulane Law Review 1675; Andrew J. 
Yu, “From Video Games to Artificial Intelligence: Assigning Copyright Ownership to Works Generated by 




Bridy, “The Evolution of Authorship” (2016) 39 Colum. J. L. & Arts 395, 395. That machines can be truly 
creative and autonomous is not unanimously accepted. Several commentators stress that human beings 
must still be considered in control of the whole AI generative process; see, for example, Ginsburg and 
Budiardjo, “Authors and Machines” (2018) 34 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 343, 344, 401–405 
(noting that “[n]o machine is itself a source of creativity” and that every action of a machine is “the product 
of the precise articulation of commands by a human programmer or machine operator”. These authors 
believe that today’s generative machines are at best “faithful” and “obedient” agents of the humans who 
interact with them, and that execute specific instructions from them. A similar view is voiced by Hedrick, 
“I Think, Therefore I Create” (2019) 8 NYU J. Intell. Prop. & Ent. L. 324, 365, arguing that “there are 
human programmers and users who write the algorithm’s code, set the objective functions and other 
parameters of the algorithm, and decide whether the algorithm is creating the desired outputs or whether it 
ought to be tweaked. These humans are masterminding the creative process; even complex AI models are 
simply following the humans’ commands (or at least creative guidelines, criteria, and rules)” (p.332). 
Hedrick also argues that “[e]ven when an algorithm generates something H-creative (‘historically creative’ 
i.e., never before created by humans), such creativity is the result of the instructions and capabilities 
programmed by its creator and is therefore dictated by the (creative) choices of the programmer or user” 
(p.339). She further notes that “[the] programmer or user therefore “superintends” and “masterminds” the 
work of the algorithm, providing it with parameters that guide its functionality and data that determines its 
trajectory” (p.353); and that “algorithms can be programmed to exhibit apparent creativity as the result of 
built-in randomness and other rules, including commands to break certain rules in order to create more 
unique works. However, that creativity is still the result of those rules and of the creative choices made by 




Sam Ricketson, “People or Machines: The Berne Convention and the Changing Concept of Authorship” 
(1991–1992) 16 Colum. J. L. & Arts 1, 8 and 11 (adding that “[t]here must still be evident some human 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3617197
 18 
 
contribution to the form of the work for which protection is claimed. To put it crudely, the work must not 
be generated by a machine or be the result of some organized industrial undertaking wherein it is 




See Ley 22/11 sobre la Propiedad Intelectual de 1987, Preambulo: “los derechos que corresponden al autor, 
que es quien realiza la tarea puramente humana y personal de creacion de la obra y que, por lo mismo, 




French Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle art.L112-1. The French Code of intellectual property defines 








This was confirmed by a dictum in Urantia Foundation v Maaherra, 895 F. Supp. 1337 (D. Ariz. 1995) at 












The Compendium of US Copyright Office Practices is a manual published by the Office, used by staff as a 








US Copyright Office, Register of Copyright, 67th Annual Report of the Register of Copyrights (1964), 












Cummins v Bond [1927] 1 Ch. 167 Ch D; Oliver v Saint Germain Foundation, 41 F. Supp. 296 (S.D. Cal. 
1941); Urantia Foundation v Burton, No.K 75-255 CA 4, 1980; Urantia Foundation v Maaherra, 895 F. 














Painer v Standard VerlagsGmbH, Opinion of A.G. Trsteniak (12 April 2011) (C-5/08) EU:C:2009:465; 




See Zhang Yangfei, “Court Rules AI-Written Article Has Copyright”, (9 January 2020), China Daily, 





Justine Pila, “An Intentional View of the Copyright Work” (2008) 71 Modern Law Review 535. See also 
Daniela Simone, Copyright and Collective Authorship: Locating the Authors of Collaborative Work 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), and Luke McDonagh, “Rearranging the Roles of the 





Lucasfilm Ltd v Ainsworth [2011] UKSC 39; [2012] 1 A.C. 208. 
 
48 Such a point has been raised in the context of the US copyright system by Yaniski-Ravid and 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3617197
 19 
 
 Velez-Hernandez, “Copyrightability of Artworks Produced by Creative Robots and Originality: The 
Formality-Objective Model” (2018) 19 Minn. J.L. Sci. & Tech. 1, 33–35, 41–42 (also noting that “adopting 
an objective perspective of originality would enable judges and juries to evaluate works made not only by 
humans, who act with intention, but also works created by creative robots, for which it remains difficult to 
understand the concept of consciousness and intention … In other words, we claim that the creator’s 
subjective intention to make a derivative work is irrelevant … [T]he objective criterion is inevitable for 




See 17 U.S.C. §101 (including the definition of “work made for hire”). In the UK commissioned works are, 




Bridy, “Coding Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially Intelligent Author” (2012) Stanford Technology 
Law Review 1; see also Hristov, “Artificial Intelligence and the Copyright Dilemma” (2016) 57 IDEA: The 








Palace, “What If Artificial Intelligence Wrote This: Artificial Intelligence and Copyright Law” (2019) 71 
Fla L. Rev. 217, 235 (proposing to amend 17 U.S.C. §101 of the US Copyright Act by specifying that a 





Glasser, “Copyrights in Computer-Generated Works: Whom, If Anyone, Do We Reward?” (2001) 1 Duke 

























See also Dorotheou, “Reap the Benefits and Avoid the Legal Uncertainty” (2015) 21 C.T.L.R. 85, 90 
(noting that “[t]he connection between the programmer’s work (i.e. the underlying code) and the final work 
is too remote” and that in AI scenarios “the device is thinking entirely by itself. There can no longer be a 
link to the programmer, irrespective of whether the programmer was the original creator. The relationship 
exhibits parallels to that of a parent and child. Without the parent, the child would not exist. However, once 
the child grows up and becomes able to think and interact by itself, the parent can no longer claim 
ownership over things created by its offspring. There is clear break between the algorithm that underpins 
the artificial intelligence device and the final output. Therefore the principles of derivative works do not 




This provision just applies in case of literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works generated by computers. It 
seems thus to suggest that other types of works that may be produced by machines such as movies, 
software, or databases are not copyright protected: see Alessio Chiabotto, “Intellectual Property Rights over 
non-human generated creations” (28 February 2017), SSRN, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3053772 [Accessed 








Namely, Ireland, New Zealand, India, South Africa and Hong Kong. This provision also inspired the 1990 
WIPO Draft Model Copyright Law, which provides that the original owner of the economic rights in a 
computer-generated work may be either the person or entity “by whom or by which the arrangements 
necessary for the creation of the work are undertaken” or the person or entity “at the initiative and under the 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3617197
 20 
 
responsibility of whom or of which the work is created and disclosed”: see International Bureau of WIPO, 




The need for an expansion of the concept of author has been acknowledged for long time in legal 
scholarship, including in the US since the 1980s: see Butler, “Can a Computer be an Author?” (1982) 4 
Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 707, 744–745 (noting that “[w]hen courts find that a given product of AI 





Also, the CDPA has opted to use the term “author” when referring to the creator of a computer-generated 
work rather than, for example, the more neutral word “maker”, which is used in the EU Database Directive 
to define the person that comes up with a database (art.7.1). One may thus wonder whether the UK CDPA 
has tried to “humanise” computer-generated works by avoiding using impersonal and neutral terminology; 





Yangfei, “Court Rules AI-Written Article Has Copyright” (9 January 2020), China Daily, 





Andreas Rahmatian, “Originality in UK Copyright Law: The Old ‘Skill and Labour’ Doctrine Under 




See also Guadamuz, “Do Androids Dream of Electric Copyright?” [2017] I.P.Q. 169, 176; Lionel Bently, 
mentioned by Begoña González Otero and Joao Pedro Quintais, “Before the Singularity: Copyright and 
the Challenges of Artificial Intelligence”, Kluwer Copyright Blog (2018), 
http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2018/09/25/singularity-copyright-challenges-artificial-intelligence 
[Accessed 18 March 2020] (stressing that the CDPA provisions on computer-generated works do not offer 
a useful model for protecting AI outputs, because of their incompatibility with the EU copyright acquis and 




See also David Vaver, “Translation and Copyright: A Canadian Focus” (1994) 4 E.I.P.R. 159 (noting, in 
relation to the expansion of the concept of author, that “computer-generated works join the list of other 
works for which the UK Act has created a fictitious author: the producer of a film or sound record, the 
maker of a broadcast, the provider of a cable service programme – almost all of which are equally fictitious 




Ricketson, “People or Machines: The Berne Convention and the Changing Concept of Authorship” 












See also Boyden, “Emergent Works” (2016) 39 Colum. J.L. & Arts 377, 391 (noting that works created by 
machines “need no protection under a moral rights theory as the expression of a human being’s 
personhood, nor under a natural rights theory as intellectual labor, because again there is neither human 




UK, HL Deb. (25 February 1988), Vol.493, col.1305 (mentioned by Guadamuz, “Do Androids Dream of 








Nova Productions v Mazooma Games [2007] EWCA Civ. 219; [2007] Bus. L.R. 1032 at [106]. A similar 
conclusion was reached by US courts in Williams Electronics Inc v Artic International Inc, 685 F. 2d 870 
(3d Cir. 1982), and Midway Manufacturing Inc v Artic International Inc, 704 F. 2d 1009 (7th Cir.), cert 
denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983). In the latter case, the court in particular noted that “[t]he question is whether 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3617197
 21 
 
the creative effort in playing a video game is enough like writing or painting to make each performance of a 
video game the work of the player and not the game’s inventor. We think it is not …. The player of a video 




Lorna Brazell, “Can Copyright Survive Artificial Intelligence?” (8 February 2018), 




Ramalho, “Will Robots Rule the (Artistic) World?” (2017) 21 Journal of Internet Law 12, 12–20. See also 
Ginsburg and Budiardjo, “Authors and Machines” (2018) 34 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 343, where 




See also Brown, “Artificial Authors: A Case for Copyright in Computer-Generated Works” (2018) 20 








Boyden, “Emergent Works” (2016) 39 Colum. J.L. & Arts 377, 384; see also Miller, “Copyright Protection 
for Computer Programs, Databases, and Computer-Generated Works” (1993) 5 Harvard Law Review 977, 
1059 (highlighting the need to settle for a case-by-case approach that examines the specific facts and the 




Glasser, “Copyrights in Computer-Generated Works” (2001) 1 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 24; see also Hristov, 








Rosen, “A Common Law for the Ages of Intellectual Property” (1984) 38 U. Miami L. Rev. 769, 803–804 
(noting that, even though the robot takes decisions on its own, such decisions are taken within boundaries 
established by the programmer, and that the programmer’s decision to put the machine in the position to 
















Yet, this argument cannot be relied on when it comes to highly interactive programs such as modern 





Dorotheou, “Reap the Benefits and Avoid the Legal Uncertainty” (2015) 21 C.T.L.R. 85, 90. Yet, see also 
Samuelson, “Allocating Ownership Rights in Computer-Generated Works” (1985–86) 47 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 
1208, 1202–1203, reminding us that whomever tape-records a live performance of a sound recording, i.e. a 




Perry and Margoni, “From Music Tracks to Google Maps: Who Owns Computer-Generated Works?” 









Glasser, “Copyrights in Computer-Generated Works” (2001) 1 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 24; see also 
Yanisky-Ravid, “Generating Rembrandt” (2017) Mich. St. Law Review 659, 670, 675 (adding that “the 
human inventor or programmer of such a machine seems to have no more claim to a copyright in such a 
work than an artist’s mother has to her child’s work, or than a camera manufacturer has to the photos taken 
by photographers, or than a piano manufacturer has to the melody being created by the musicians while 
using the instrument”). 











Samuelson, “Allocating Ownership Rights in Computer-Generated Works” (1985–86) 47 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 
1208, 1220. See also Caen A. Demic, “AI-Generated Fashion Designs: Who or What Owns the Goods? 
(2020) 30 Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal 593 (making the point 
that—when it comes to AI creations in the field of designs—end-users, namely fashion houses or 








Yanisky-Ravid, “Generating Rembrandt” [2017] Mich. St. Law Review 659, 706; see also Ralston, 
“Copyright in Computer-Composed Music” (2005) 52 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 281, 290 (noting that 
controls are often provided by the programmer to users, including enabling/disabling music input, 








Grubow, “O.K. Computer” (2018) 40 Cardozo Law Review 397. Yet, see also Andrew J. Yu, “From Video 












Brown, “Artificial Authors: A Case for Copyright in Computer-Generated Works” (2018) 20 Columbia 
Science & Technology Law Review 1, 39; see also Cronin, “Virtual Music Scores, Copyright and the 
Promotion of a Marginalized Technology” (2004) 28 Colum. J.L. & Arts 18, 19 (noting that purchases of 




Denicola, “Ex Machina: Copyright Protection for Computer-Generated Works” (2016) 69 Rutgers L. Rev. 
251, 283–285; see also Samuelson, “Allocating Ownership Rights in Computer-Generated Works” 
(1985–86) 47 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1185, 1203, 1207–1208 (noting that by licensing the use of the generator 
program the programmer implicitly grants the user rights in whatever output is generated from the 
computer program; and that the purchaser of the program can reasonably assume that the acquisition of the 








Brown, “Artificial Authors: A Case for Copyright in Computer-Generated Works” (2018) 20 Columbia 




Yu, “From Video Games to Artificial Intelligence” (1997) 25 AIPLA Q.J 131; see also Dorotheou, “Reap 
the Benefits and Avoid the Legal Uncertainty” (2015) 21 C.T.L.R. 85, 89 (noting that the idea that the 
programmer would automatically own everything that the AI device is capable of producing would be an 
undesirable outcome as it would over-reward the programmer). See also Denicola, “Ex Machina: Copyright 
Protection for Computer-Generated Works” (2016) 69 Rutgers L. Rev. 251, 283–285 (arguing that giving 
programmers copyright may often turn out to be useless as programmers themselves would frequently be 




See McCutcheon, “The Vanishing Author in Computer-Generated Works” (2013) 36 Melbourne University 








Ralston, “Copyright in Computer-Composed Music” (2005) 52 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 281, 295–296; 
see also Boyden, “Emergent Works” (2016) 39 Colum. J.L. & Arts 377, 386 (perceiving the collaboration 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3617197
 23 
 
between the programmer and user as a sort of spectrum and noting that “[a]s the amount of user control 




Samuelson, “Allocating Ownership Rights in Computer-Generated Works” (1985–86) 47 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 
1185, 1202–1203 (comparing the user to the person who records a jazz improvisation session, and therefore 




Samuelson, “Allocating Ownership Rights in Computer-Generated Works” (1985–86) 47 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 
1185, 1222; see also Butler, “Can a Computer be an Author?” (1982) 4 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 707, 

















Timothy Pinto, “Robo ART! The Copyright Implications of Artificial Intelligence Generated Art” (2019) 
30 Ent. L.R. 177 (making the point that the UK originality test allows for copyright in AI generated art to 
subsist even where there is no human author; and in particular that it is easier to accept that an AI machine 
exercises skill, labour and judgement). See also Jacob Turner, Robot Rules: Regulating Artificial 
Intelligence (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2008), p.122 (noting that “there is a good argument for 
saying that AI is even more creative than humans, in that all humans are restricted by our biological 




Grubow, “O.K. Computer” (2018) 40 Cardozo Law Review 409 (noting that “[n]eural networks are an AI’s 
unique DNA and, perhaps, give AIs their ‘personality’ which allows for greater variance in its outputs as it 
learns more music. This function is no different than when a human composer’s compositional style 




Milde, “Can a Computer Be an ‘Author’ or an ‘Inventor’?” (1969) 51 J. Pat. 378, 403 (also noting, at 
393–395, that, when the computer exercises independent creation, it should at least be considered a 
co-author of the work it creates, together with the programmer and the person who provided it with data); 
on AI as co-author see also Grubow, “O.K. Computer” (2018) 40 Cardozo Law Review 409, 416–418. For 
an opposite position see Butler, “Can a Computer be an Author?” (1982) 4 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 
707 740–741 (noting that “[i]n the man-machine joint author situation, the concept of an ‘agreement’ has 








See also Miller, “Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and Computer-Generated 
Works” (1993) 5 Harvard Law Review 977, 1043 (noting that “[t]he technology has not yet produced a 
world of copyright without human authors, and there is no reason to believe that we are en route to that 
world or, even if we are, that we will reach it in the foreseeable future”); Ginsburg and Budiardjo, “Authors 
and Machines” (2018) 34 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 343 (making the argument that all computers, 
even the most advanced in machine learning, do not originate anything, but they just follow orders); 
Grimmelmann, “There’s No Such Thing as a Computer-Authored Work” (2016) 39 Colum. J. L. & Arts 
377 (starting his article by noting: “I would like to talk about computer-authored works—I would like to, 





Bridy, “Coding Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially Intelligent Author” (2012) Stanford Technology 
Law Review 1; Butler, “Can a Computer be an Author?” (1982) 4 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 707, 740 




Dorotheou, “Reap the Benefits and Avoid the Legal Uncertainty” (2015) 21 C.T.L.R. 85, 91. 
 









Glasser, “Copyrights in Computer-Generated Works” (2001) 1 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 24; see also Butler, 
“Can a Computer be an Author?” (1982) 4 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 707, 739 (wondering how a 
machine could be a real party in interest in a lawsuit); Farr, “Copyrightability of Computer-created Works” 
(1989) 15 R.U.C.T.L.J. 63, 79; Clifford, “Intellectual Property in the Era of the Creative Computer 
Program” (1997) 71 Tulane Law Review 1675, 1686 (noting that “the computer would need the power to 












Dani Deahl, “How AI-Generate Music is Changing the Way Hits are Made” (31 August 2019), 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/8/31/17777008/artificial-intelligence-taryn-southern-amper-music 




Yanisky-Ravid, “Generating Rembrandt: Artificial Intelligence, Copyright, and Accountability in the 3A 




Peter Schjeldahl, “A Few Words About the Faux Rembrandt” (8 April 2016), The New Yorker, 





See also Celine Melanie A. Dee, “Examining Copyright Protection of AI-Generated Art” (2018) 1 Delphi – 








Jean-Marc Deltorn, “Deep Creations: Intellectual Property and the Automata” (1 February 2017), 




Stephen Carlisle, “Should Music Created by Artificial Intelligence Be Protected by Copyright?” (7 June 
2019), http://copyright.nova.edu/ai [Accessed 19 March 2020]; see also Sobel, “Artificial Intelligence’s 
Fair Use Crisis” (2017) 41 Colum. J.L. & Arts 45, 66 (focusing on the difficulties to assess access to 
copyright works, and in particular noting that “[t]he situation is indeed complicated when an allegedly 
copied work is absent in input data. This phenomenon could have several causes: perhaps the model was 
programmed to find input data by crawling the web on its own, and its activities were not logged. Or, most 
intriguing, perhaps the model was given a known, finite set of input data that excluded the plaintiff’s work, 
and nevertheless created substantially similar output. This is not as farfetched as it sounds: consider a 
machine learning model instructed to generate funk music, trained on a corpus of all funk recordings except 
the work of James Brown, the definitive originator of the genre. All funk songs bear a debt to James 
Brown, so it would not be altogether surprising if the funky AI generated output that was substantially 




Sobel, “Artificial Intelligence’s Fair Use Crisis” (2017) 41 Colum. J.L. & Arts 45, 45; Lim, “AI & IP: 












For the first judicial acknowledgment of non-expressive fair use, see Sega Enterprises Ltd v Accolade Inc, 




Authors Guild Inc v Google Inc, 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Authors Guild v Google Inc, 804 F. 
(3d) 202 (2nd Cir 2015). 
 









Giovanni Sartor, Francesca Lagioia and Giuseppe Contissa, “The Use of Copyrighted Works by AI 
Systems: Art Works in the Data Mill” (2018), SSRN, 




See Benjamin Sobel’s interview with the intellectual property blog Ipwatch, 
https://www.ip-watch.org/2017/08/23/dilemma-fair-use-expressive-machine-learning-interview-ben-sobel/ 




This example is given by Schafer, Komuves, Zatarain and Diver, “A Fourth Law of Robotics?” (2015) 23 








There is obviously no point in engaging in a fair use debate when the works analysed by the machine have 
already fallen into the public domain, and therefore are no longer protected by copyright, as happened for 




Lim, “AI & IP: Innovation & Creativity in an Age of Accelerated Change” (2018) 52 Akron Law Review 
813 (commenting on the AI music composer Jukedeck and noting in particular that “[t]here is no doubt that 
AI-generated, royalty-free sound recordings would jeopardize the market for recordings that are composed 
and performed by humans in a traditional fashion. Jukedeck’s rates are lower than what it would cost to 
license a conventional sound recording, and its output is not limited by the constraints human composers or 












Carlisle, “Should Music Created by Artificial Intelligence Be Protected by Copyright?” (7 June 2019), 




Sobel, “Artificial Intelligence’s Fair Use Crisis” (2017) 41 Colum. J.L. & Arts 45, 82; see also Lim, “AI & 
IP: Innovation & Creativity in an Age of Accelerated Change” (2018) 52 Akron Law Review 813. (arguing 
that machines that create commercially valuable music, literature and art after being trained on copyright 





James Grimmelmann, “Copyright for Literate Robots” (2016) 101 Iowa Law Review 657, 658 and 
674–675 (noting provocatively that “copyright has concluded that reading by robots doesn’t count. 
Infringement is for humans only; when computers do it, it’s fair use”; adding that “a transformative fair use 
that categorically exempts robots means that a digital humanist can skim a million books with abandon 
while a humanist who reads a few books closely must pay full freight for hers”; and that “[r]ebroadcast one 
radio station for humans and you’re an infringer; copy a thousand TV stations for computers and you’re a 




Amanda Levendowski, “How Copyright Law Can Fix Artificial Intelligence’s Implicit Bias Problem” 
(2018) 93 Washington Law Review 579, 625 (also noting that “A best-selling novel becomes data about 
how humans use language; a selfie becomes data about the features of the human face; a conversation from 









Sobel, “Artificial Intelligence’s Fair Use Crisis” (2017) 41 Colum. J.L. & Arts 45, 89. 
 
151 Levendowski, “How Copyright Law Can Fix Artificial Intelligence’s Implicit Bias Problem” (2018) 93 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3617197
 26 
 




Levendowski, “How Copyright Law Can Fix Artificial Intelligence’s Implicit Bias Problem” (2018) 93 




Levendowski, “How Copyright Law Can Fix Artificial Intelligence’s Implicit Bias Problem” (2018) 93 




Louise Matsakis, “Copyright Law Makes Artificial Intelligence Bias Worse” (2017), 
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/59ydmx/copyright-law-artificial-intelligence-bias [Accessed 19 
March 2020] (also noting that in reality, due to potential copyright implications, “major AI companies keep 
the data they use to train their products a secret, preventing journalists and academics from uncovering 




See again Levandowski, “How Copyright Law Can Fix Artificial Intelligence’s Implicit Bias Problem” 




See Directive 2001/29 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the 




See also Thomas Margoni, “Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning and EU Copyright Law: Who Owns 




This example is given by Schafer, Komuves, Zatarain and Diver, “A Fourth Law of Robotics?” (2015) 23 




Schönberger, “Deep Copyright: UP- and Downstream Questions Related to Artificial Intelligence (AI)” in 








Football Association Premier League Ltd v QC Leisure (C-403/08) EU:C:2011:631; [2012] Bus. L.R. 




See Directive 2019/790 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market arts 3 and 4. Article 3 




See Directive 2019/790 art.2(2), which defines text and data mining as “any automated analytical technique 
aimed at analyzing text and data in digital form in order to generate information which includes but is not 








See also Directive 2019/790, Recital 11 (highlighting EU policies which encourage “universities and 




The UK CDPA also provides a text- and data-mining exception, which is limited to the copying of works 








Eleonora Rosati, “Copyright as an Obstacle or an Enabler? A European Perspective on Text and Data 




Gervais, “The Machine as Author” (2019) 105 Iowa Law Review 1 (noting that “machine productions are 
not protectible by copyright once the machine has crossed what the Article calls the autonomy threshold 
and is no longer a tool in the user’s hands or a reflection of its (human-made) program”); see also Yu, 
“From Video Games to Artificial Intelligence” (1997) 25 AIPLA Q.J 333, 1265–1266. 






Khoury, “Intellectual Property Rights for Hubots” (2016–17) 35 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 635, 668; see 




Lim, “AI & IP: Innovation & Creativity in an Age of Accelerated Change” (2018) 52 Akron Law Review 
813 (noting how according to several commentators the fall into the public domain of these works will 
provide fertilizer “to give birth to new artistic genres and whole new areas of innovation, where humans 




Clifford, “Intellectual Property in the Era of the Creative Computer Program” (1997) 71 Tulane Law 




Levendowski, “How Copyright Law Can Fix Artificial Intelligence’s Implicit Bias Problem” (2018) 93 
Washington Law Review 579, 597. See also Benoit Michaux, “Singularité technologique, singularité 
humaine et droit d’auteur” in Laws, Norms and Freedoms in Cyberspace/Droits, norms et libertés dans le 
cybermonde (Brussels: Larcier, 2018), pp.401–416 (noting that copyright protection of AI-produced 
outputs could bring an increase in the number of protected works and favour the concentration of 












McCutcheon, “The Vanishing Author in Computer-Generated Works” A Critical Analysis of Recent 




See for example Bently, mentioned by Otero and Quintais, “Before the Singularity: Copyright and the 
Challenges of Artificial Intelligence” (2018), Kluwer Copyright Blog, 
http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2018/09/25/singularity-copyright-challenges-artificial-intelligence 
[Accessed 18 March 2020]; Perry and Margoni, “From Music Tracks to Google Maps: Who Owns 
Computer-Generated Works?” 2010) 26 C.L.S.R. 621; Gervais, “The Machine as Author” (2019) 105 Iowa 





See also McCutcheon, “The Vanishing Author in Computer-Generated Works: A Critical Analysis of 
Recent Australian Case Law” (2013) 36 Melbourne University Law Review 915, 952 (noting that “while 
the incentive of copyright may be irrelevant to a novelist compelled to write their opus, it may well explain 
why an expensive computer-generated production is made. Without that reward, the work may not be made 









Hedrick, “I Think, Therefore I Create” (2019) 8 NYU J. Intell. Prop. & Ent. L. 324, 350 (casting doubts on 




Yu, “The Machine Author: What Level of Copyright Protection Is Appropriate for Fully Independent 




Raquel Acosta, “Artificial Intelligence and Authorship Rights” (17 February 2012), 
http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/artificial-intelligence-and-authorship-rights [Accessed 19 March 2020] 
(noting that if AI programmers come up with “some sort of novel invention in the creation of the program, 
such as developing a predictive algorithm that allows a two dimensional image to be easily converted to a 
3D image, they may apply for patent protection of that algorithm”). See also Jean-Marc Deltorn and 
Franck Macrez, “Authorship in the Age of Machine learning and Artificial Intelligence”. Centre for 
International Intellectual Property Studies (CEIPI) Research Paper No.2018-10 (2018). 
 
183 Ginsburg and Budiardjo, “Authors and Machines” (2018) 34 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 343, 455; 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3617197
 28 
 
 McCutcheon, “The Vanishing Author in Computer-Generated Works” A Critical Analysis of Recent 




Robert Plotkin, The Genie in the Machine: How Computer-Automated Inventing is Revolutionizing Law & 




Anne Lauber-Rönsberg and Sven Hetmank, “The Concept of Authorship under Pressure: Does Artificial 
Intelligence Shift Paradigms?” (2019) 14 J.I.P.L.P. 509, 577. See also Saiz García, “Las obras creadas por 
sistemas de inteligencia artificial y su protección por derecho de autor” [2019] InDret, Revista para el 
análisis del derecho; Ramalho, “Will Robots Rule the (Artistic) World?” (2017) 21 Journal of Internet Law 
12, 16–20 (proposing to adopt a (i) regime similar to the EU database right under the EU Database 
Directive (Directive 1996/9), which notoriously aims at protecting investments made in producing 
compilation of data; or (ii) a sort of “disseminator’s right” comparable to the publisher’s right in the 
publication of previously unpublished works provided by the EU Term of Protection Directive (Directive 
93/98), replaced by Directive 2006/116). The second proposal is more concerned with enhancing the 
accessibility of AI produced content: while such a right would be inherently economic, it would allow the 
right holder to extract value out of the creations and at the same time aim at encouraging the dissemination 
of algorithmic output. For academic opinions against sui generis systems of protection of AI-generated 
outputs, see Patrick Goold, “Artificial Authors? Copyright in Works of Machine Learning: A Call to 




Yu, “The Machine Author: What Level of Copyright Protection Is Appropriate for Fully Independent 




AIPPI Summary Report – 2019 Study Question on Copyright/Data Copyright in Artificially Generated 
Works, p.17, 
https://aippi.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/SummaryReport_COPYRIGHT-DATA_London2019_final_




Section 12(7) of the CDPA states that copyright in computer-generated works “expires at the end of the 




Gervais, “The Machine as Author” (2019) 105 Iowa Law Review 1. On intrinsic motivations as factors 
which stimulate creativity, see Christopher Buccafusco and Christopher Sprigman, “Experiments in 
Intellectual Property” in Peter Menell and David Schwartz (eds), Research Handbook on the Economics of 




AIPPI Summary Report, pp.7–8, 
https://aippi.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/SummaryReport_COPYRIGHT-DATA_London2019_final_




AIPPI Summary Report, p.13, 
https://aippi.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/SummaryReport_COPYRIGHT-DATA_London2019_final_




See again AIPPI Summary Report, p.17, (German Group) (noting that a shorter term of protection is 
justified in light of “the reduction in costs by using the AI in generating the works … to safeguard the 








See also Sobel, “Artificial Intelligence’s Fair Use Crisis” (2017) 41 Colum. J.L. & Arts 45, 91, proposing 
the introduction of levies on machine learning to compensate copyright owners and in general human 
creators, for example, by channeling the proceeds of the levy to artistry charities (it may be argued that a 
similar system could also be engineered in the context of a sui generis right). In exchange for a levy system, 
Sobel moreover argues in his article, AI companies and individuals could be exempted by law from any 
liability for copyright infringement, which would guarantee the future of these technologies. Sobel further 
notes that the judiciary could also award owners of copyright over the source material compensation on a 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3617197
 29 
 
case-by-case basis, without, however, allowing them to obtain injunctions aimed at stopping expressive 
machine learning. The idea of charging AI systems a fee to compensate creators of works that have been 
fed into creative machines is not new. A compulsory licence fee to be paid to AI creators was proposed in 
1994 by Vigderson, “Hamlet II: The Sequel” (1994) 28 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 401, 431. See also the more 
recent 2017 draft report to the European Parliament’s Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics 
(rapporteur Mady Delvaux), which highlighted “the possible need to introduce corporate reporting 
requirements on the extent and proportion of the contribution of robotics and AI to the economic results of 
























AIPPI Summary Report, pp.16–17 (UK Group position). Finally, no moral rights should follow the 
introduction of this sui generis form of protection. After all, UK copyright law currently excludes the 
applicability of moral rights to computer-generated works. On the inappropriateness of the proximity 
approach when it comes to attributing copyright in AI-generated artworks, see Megan Svedman, “Artificial 




See also Toby Bond and Sarah Blair, “Artificial Intelligence & Copyright: Section 9(3) or Authorship 
Without an Author” (2019) 14 J.I.P.L.P. 423 (noting that the solution may lie in recognising 
computer-created works as deserving of only economic rights similar to those offered to movies, 
broadcasts, sound recordings and typographical arrangements). After all, a sui generis approach had been 
advocated by Karl Milde back in 1969: see Milde, “Can a Computer Be an ‘Author’ or an ‘Inventor’?” 
(1969) 51 J. Pat. 378, 402 (stressing “the necessity of a new type of protection, sui generis to the problem 




Florian De Rouck, “Moral Rights & AI Environments: the Unique Bond between Intelligent Agents and 




Miller, “Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and Computer-Generated Works” (1993) 








Miller, “Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and Computer-Generated Works” (1993) 
5 Harvard Law Review 977, 1066. Yet, see also Grimmelmann, “There’s No Such Thing as a 
Computer-Authored Work” (2016) 39 Colum. J. L. & Arts 377, 414 (arguing against computer authorship 
in the immediate future, but acknowledging that “it is possible that some future computer programs could 
qualify as authors. We could well have artificial intelligences that are responsive to incentives, 
unpredictable enough that we can’t simply tell them what to do, and that have attributes of personality that 




Liza Vertinsky and Todd Rice, “Thinking about Thinking Machines – Implications of Machine Inventors 









Yanisky-Ravid, “Generating Rembrandt: Artificial Intelligence, Copyright, and Accountability in the 3A 
Era” [2017] Mich. St. Law Review 659, 702. 
 









Lim, “AI & IP: Innovation & Creativity in an Age of Accelerated Change” (2018) 52 Akron Law Review 
813. See also Dornis, “Artificial Creativity: Emergent Works and the Void in Current IP Doctrine” (2020) 
22 Yale Journal of Law & Technology 1, 8 (noting that “subject matter of even minuscule creativity (such 
as works of simple handcraft) has been promoted to the status of full copyright protection throughout the 
world. Meanwhile, the copyright protection of AI-generated works remains virtually unattainable due to 




Denicola, “Ex Machina: Copyright Protection for Computer-Generated Works” (2016) 69 Rutgers L. Rev. 
251, 270. See also de Cock Buning, “Autonomous Intelligent Systems as Creative Agents under the EU 
framework for Intellectual Property” (2016) 7 E.J.R.R. 310 (noting that “if courts no longer assess the 
author, but rather the work he created, regardless of the process by which he came by it, the result of 




Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3617197
